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UNJUST ENRICHMENT, PURSUANCE OF
SELF-INTEREST, AND THE LIMITS OF FREE
RIDING
Daniel Friedmann*
I. THE INDEFINITENESS OF THE CONCEPT OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The notion of unjust enrichment has, almost since its inception
some two thousands years ago, caused innumerable difficulties and
has led on numerous occasions to unsatisfactory results. In the
words of Lord Dennnig: "This conception is too indefinite to be
stated as a principle of law."1  Professor Dawson stated, "[I]t is
obvious that the adoption of this principle as a 'rule' of law would
carry us far afield," and that "once the idea [of prohibiting
enrichment through another's loss] has been formulated as a
generalization, it has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober
citizens to jump right off the dock.",
2
Nevertheless, the Restatement of the Law of Restitution adopted
this principle and stated broadly that "[a] person who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other."
3
The tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Restitution
opted for a more concrete statement of the law by providing that the
duty to make restitution arises where a benefit was received either
through "an infringement of another person's interest, or of loss
* Danielle Rubinstein Professor of Comparative Private Law, Tel-Aviv
University; Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law. This
Article was originally included in a Festschrift in honor of Professor Arthur
von Mehren. The Festschrift was edited by Symeon C. Symeonides and James
Nafziger and published by Transnational Publishers. A number of changes
were introduced. I am grateful to Doug Rendleman for his comments.
1. SIRALFRED DENNING, THE CHANGING LAW 65 (1953).
2. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 7-8 (1951).
3. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
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suffered by the other ... ,4 This definition apparently replaces the
very term, "unjust enrichment," used by the first Restatement to
explain the basis of recovery. The words "unjust enrichment,"
omitted from the first part of the new section one, only appear at the
end of that section. It states that where the conditions enumerated in
the first part have been fulfilled, restitution is owed "in the manner
and amount necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." 5 It is thus a
modem attempt to grapple with the ancient dilemma inherent in the
concept of unjust enrichment. However, this provision was not
adopted and the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, Discussion Draft section one, reverts, with slight
modifications, to the language of the Restatement of the Law of
Restitution and provides that "[a] person who is unjustly enriched at
the expense of another is liable in restitution to the other."
6
The purpose of this Article is to examine some of the difficulties
raised by the broad concept of unjust enrichment and the attempt to
limit its application via the rule that denies liability for benefits that
the plaintiff conferred upon others when acting in pursuance of his
own interests.
II. THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE EARLY APPLICATION OF THE UNJUST
ENRICHMENT PRINCIPLE
The present Section is devoted to a comparative discussion of
some of the difficulties, which were confronted by Anglo-American
law and French law shortly after the adoption of the general principle
of unjust enrichment. The issues involved are of continuous interest
since they highlight some of the basic problems inherent in the unjust
enrichment principle. In Anglo-American law, the adoption of the
general principle of unjust enrichment is attributed to Lord
Mansfield's celebrated decision in Moses v. Macferlan.7  The
plaintiff Moses endorsed to the defendant Macferlan four promissory
notes for thirty shillings each.8 The parties expressly agreed that
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § I (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1983).
5. Id.
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
(Discussion Draft 2000).
7. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
8. See id..
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Moses would not be liable for the payment of the notes nor suffer in
any way by reason of his endorsement. 9 But Macferlan, in breach of
the agreement, sued Moses in the Court of Conscience upon these
notes. 10 In the first action, an attempt was made on Moses' behalf to
rely upon the agreement." This defense was rejected however, as
the court held that it had no power to decide upon it.' 2 Following
this decision, Moses paid the four notes and brought an action to
recover the money that he was compelled to pay.'
3
In allowing the claim, Lord Mansfield used very broad
language. 14 In fact, his judgment represents an attempt to turn the
form of action of indebitatus assumpsit, already well established in
his days, into a gate through which any claim based on unjust
enrichment could pass.' 5 Lord Mansfield stated in essence that it
suffices if the plaintiff states in his claim "that ex aequo & bono, the
money received by the defendant, ought to be deemed as belonging
to [the plaintiff]," and that the gist of the action is that "the
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties
of natural justice and equity to refund the money."' 
6
It is perhaps one of the paradoxes of legal history that the
decision, often regarded as the cornerstone of the law of restitution,
has generally been regarded-at least in its country of origin-as
wrong on the merits, on the ground that it is inconsistent with the
doctrine of res judicata and has, in fact, been overruled. 17  The
judgment which Macferlan won was never reversed and Moses v.
Macferlan was said to be "a de facto reversal of, the judgment of a
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 676-77.
14. See id. at 678-81.
15. See DAWSON, supra note 2, at 11-12.
16. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 679, 681.
17. See Marriot v. Hampton, 101 Eng. Rep. 969 (K.B. 1797). It has,
however, been pointed out that Marriot is distinguishable. In Marriot, the
plaintiff failed to prove his defense in the first trial because he lost his receipt.
But in Moses, the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to raise his defense
because the court considered that it had no power to decide upon it. In this
respect he did not have his day in court. See KENNETH H. YORK ET AL.,
REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 185 (4th ed. 1985); Comment, Moses v.
Macferlan-Is it Sound Law?, 24 YALE L.J. 246 (1914-15).
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competent court. .,18 Still, Lord Mansfield's statements continue
to exert their influence, although the decision itself has been
dissented from.
The reaction against Lord Mansfield's approach is well known.
Some of England's greatest judges commented: "[W]e are not now
free in the twentieth century to administer that vague jurisprudence
which is sometimes attractively styled 'justice between man and
man."' 9 The whole development of this branch of the law was
described as a "history of well-meaning sloppiness of thought.5
20
Indeed, the doctrine enunciated by Lord Mansfield was said to be
discarded. In a case decided as late as 1977, Lord Diplock still
maintained that English law merely provides "specific remedies in
particular cases of what might be classified as unjust enrichment in a
legal system that is based upon the civil law,"21 but it does not
recognize a general principle that allows recovery on the basis of
unjust enrichment.22 A recent decision of the House of Lords23
indicates that England has at long last embraced the principle of
unjust enrichment after having for some time moved in this direction.
Lord Mansfield was thus vindicated. But the severe resistance to his
approach and the fact that it took about two hundred years of fierce
reaction until its acceptance reflect the difficulties inherent in this
general principle. Indeed, those who strive to restrict Lord
Mansfield's generalization can always point out the very decision in
Moses v. Macferlan as an example of how reliance upon a vague
notion ofjustice can lead the court astray.
It is interesting to compare this development to that which
occurred in French law. The French civil code (the Code Napoleon)
18. LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 864 (Gareth Jones ed., 5th ed. 1998).
19. Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] 1 Ch. 127, 140 (C.A. 1912) (per
Hamilton, L.J.).
20. Holt v. Markham, [1923] 1 K.B. 504, 513 (C.A. 1922).
21. Orakpo v. Manson Investment Ltd., [1978] A.C. 95, 104 (H.L. 1977).
22. See id.; Woolwich Bldg. Soc'y v. Inland Revenue Commissions [1993]
A.C. 70, 196-97 (H.L. 1992) (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson); GOFF & JONES,
supra note 18, at 11-15.
23. Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v. Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.); see
also Banque Financi~re de la Cit6 v. Parc (Battersea) Ltd., [1998] 2 W.L.R.
475, 479-80 (H.L.) (per Lord Steyn); GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 49 (1999).
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contains a chapter on quasi contracts which deals with two basic
situations.24 One is the management of another's affairs without
mandate (negotiorum gestio) and the other relates to the recovery of
payments made under mistake.25 There is, however, no provision in
the code that adopts the general principle enjoining enrichment at
another's expense. A narrow approach to the interpretation of the
code hindered the French courts for nearly a century from adopting a
principle unsupported by legislative text. It was only in 1892, some
130 years after Moses v. Macferlan, that the Cour de Cassation
rendered its revolutionary decision in the case of Patureau-Miran v.
Boudier.26  In that case, the plaintiffs supplied fertilizers to the
defendant's lessee.27 The lessee used the fertilizer to improve the
crop but failed to pay for it.28 He also failed to pay the rent and was
evicted by the landlord (the defendant), who thus acquired
possession of the crop improved by the use of the fertilizer supplied
by the unpaid plaintiffs. 29  The plaintiffs' claim against the
landowner was based upon his enrichment from the crop improved
by the fertilizer.30 In allowing the claim the court overcame the
difficulty, which stemmed from the absence of a legislative provision
in the code, by stating:
This action derives from the principle of equity (equit6) that
enjoins the enrichment at another's expense, and as it has
not been ordered by any legislative text, its application is
not subject to any specific condition; it suffices... that the
plaintiff.., proves that he conferred a benefit by a sacrifice
31or personal act... to the person whom he sues ....
24. See CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 1371-77 (Fr.).
25. See id.
26. Cass. req., June 15, 1892, S. Jur 1 1893, 1, 281, note M. Labb6. For a
detailed discussion of this case, see DAWSON, supra note 2, at 100-05; Barry
Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36 TUL.
L. REV. 605, 622-46 (1962).
27. See Nicholas, supra note 26, at 622.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Boudier, S. Jur I. 281 (translation by the author); see DAWSON, supra
note 2, at 102; see also Nicholas, supra note 26, at 622 (quoting from the text
of the case).
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The Boudier case raised considerable difficulties. The plaintiffs
had a contract with a third party (the lessee) against whom they
obviously had a claim for the price of what they supplied him. The
unjust enrichment claim was predicated on the ground that while the
plaintiffs remained unpaid, the defendant was incidentally enriched
by the plaintiffs' performance. 32 The problem of recovering for such
incidental or indirect enrichment is discussed later.33 In the present
case, however, there was an additional obstacle to recovery. The
source of the defendant's enrichment was his contract with his
lessee. How then can his enrichment be unjust? Indeed, the decision
is not in line with modem French law, under which such enrichment
is not without legal cause. The source of the enrichment is the
contract with another party, and this contract provides adequate
"6cause" (or ground) justifying the enrichment. 34 The only possible
explanation of Boudier lies in the fact, not mentioned in the
judgment itself, that in the account drawn between the landlord (the
defendant) and the evicted tenant, the tenant was credited with the
value of the crop from which the cost of the fertilizer had been
deducted (possibly because the parties assumed that the defendant
would have to pay for it).
35
Despite the large differences in French and English law on the
subject, it is interesting to note the similarities in the development of
this branch of the law. French law is codified. English law is not.
In both legal systems, however, this branch of the law has its origin
in a landmark court's decision, not in a legislative provision. The
leading decision, which in each of these legal systems laid the
foundation of the law of unjust enrichment, is highly problematic on
the merits. Moses v. Macferlan is regarded in England as having
been wrongly decided, while Pantureu-Miran v. Boudier is at best
explicable on the basis of a fact that the decision failed to mention.
In both instances, the importance of the decision does not lie in the
specific application of the rule, but in the general doctrine
pronounced in the broadest possible terms. Common to both
32. See Nicholas, supra note 26, at 622.
33. See infra Section V.G.
34. See FRANCOIs TERRE ET AL., DROIT CIVIL-LES OBLIGATIONS 899-
900 (7th ed. 1999); Nicholas, supra note 26, at 622-33.
35. See Nicholas, supra note 26, at 622-33.
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decisions is the emphasis upon the term justice or its synonyms
("natural justice" and "equity" in Moses v. Macferlan and "equitd" in
Boudier) as the basis of recovery.
36
There is also considerable similarity in the reaction to these two
leading cases. The English reaction to Moses v. Macferlan was
already mentioned.37 In France, there were also serious misgivings
regarding the adoption of a nebulous principle that might undermine
legal stability.38 The incorporation of a vague concept of justice as
part of a legal principle seemed particularly frightening.39 While the
general principle enjoining unjust enrichment became part of French
law, 40 doubts regarding the adoption of such an abstract concept of
justice are manifested in the severe restrictions developed by the
French courts for the application of the doctrine of unjust
enrichment. The unjust enrichment claim is "subsidiary"-it is
conditional upon the absence of another cause of action (in torts,
contracts or quasi contracts as defined by the code), and the
enrichment must be "without legal ground" ("sans cause").
41
Another requirement is a loss or an "impoverishment"
("appauvrissement") of the plaintiff as against the defendant's
enrichment.42 In addition, the claim is excluded where the plaintiff
acted at his risk for his own benefit.43  These limitations have
generally been adopted by other legal systems that follow the French
legal tradition.44
The principle of unjust enrichment was adopted in section 812
of the German Civil Code (BGB), which avoided the use of the term
"unjust" enrichment and speaks instead of enrichment "without legal
36. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 678; Boudier, S. Jur I. 281.
37. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
38. See Nicholas, supra note 26, at 622-46.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See TERRt ET AL., supra note 34, at 898-902.
42. See id.
43. See id. For a long time it has also been considered that the claim is only
available if there has been no fault on the plaintiffs part. However, this
limitation upon the right of recovery has been recently watered down by the
Cour de Cassation. It now seems that only fraud or severe fault (faute lourde)
would preclude recovery. See TERRE ET AL., supra note 34, at 900-01.
44. See e.g., REVISED STATUES OF QUEBEC [R.S.Q.] (Can.) (following
French law tradition as foundation).
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ground" ("ohne rechtlichen grund").45 This terminology shifts the
emphasis from morality (just or unjust) to the seemingly safer realm
of the law, with which lawyers are expected to be better acquainted.
The term is similar to the one used in modem French law that speaks
of "enrichment without legal cause" ("enrichissment sans cause").
Nevertheless, article 812 of the BGB is worded in broad terms, and
German law imposes a number of restrictions upon its application.
One restriction, which has little basis in the language of the code, is
that the enrichment must be "direct." 46 Another restriction relates to
the priority of the "performance restitution," the Leistungskondiktion
(the claim to recover the value of performance rendered by one party
to the other without legal ground or on the basis of a legal ground
that subsequently failed).47 When this claim is available, it excludes
other potential restitutionary claims. I do not propose to discuss the
position of German law in any great detail. For our purposes, it
suffices to point out that it also developed rules that led to the
containment of the general principle. Thus, under German law, the
claim in a case like that of Boudier would be denied. The plaintiffs,
the fertilizer suppliers, performed vis-A-vis the tenant who was the
other party to their contract. The enrichment of the defendant (the
landowner) was therefore "indirect" and a claim in restitution against
him would be excluded.48
In this respect, American law is unique. Section one of the
Restatement of the Law of Restitution adopted the general principle
in the broadest possible terms.49 No doubt its application is subject
to limitations such as denial of recovery to a "volunteer."
Nevertheless, in its American version, the principle is extremely
broad, flexible, and open-ended. Indeed, American law never
experienced the struggle which other legal systems evidenced to
confine the general principle, if not to eliminate it altogether. Still,
45. BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Civil Code) [BGB] § 812 (F.R.G.).
46. See John P. Dawson, Indirect Enrichment, in 2 IUS PRIVATUM
GENTIUM 789 (Ernst von Caemmerer et al. eds., 1969); Nicholas, supra note
26, at 611; Niall R. Whitty, Indirect Enrichment in Scots Law, 1994 JURID.
REV. pt. 1, at 200, pt. 2, at 239.
47. See BGB § 812 (F.R.G.).
48. See Gerhard Dannemann, Unjust Enrichment by Transfer: Some
Comparative Remarks, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1845-46 (2001).
49. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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the difficulties encountered in other legal systems demonstrate the
problem inherent in this attractive, though often illusive, concept of
unjust enrichment.
The English legal system, which for many years confined
recovery in restitution to specific categories, was not required to
contend with this issue.50 However, it is hardly surprising that the
recent adoption of the general principle brought in its wake
misgivings regarding its seemingly unlimited potential and calls for
rules to restrict its application. 5 1  In the Sections that follow, I
examine some aspects of this issue.
III. THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
The principle of unjust enrichment is first and foremost limited
by the notion that many benefits are to be attributed to the very
existence of society, rather than to the individual who facilitated their
gain. It is our understanding that living in society entails obligations
and produces benefits. Many of these benefits are free because of
our expectations regarding the advantages that follow from the
existing social order and human activity in organized societies.
These expectations relate not merely to benefits that stem from
governmental activity, but also to benefits deriving from the
activities of individual parties. In legal terms, the denial of
recognition to some interest and the limitation imposed upon the
ambit of others reflect these expectations.
Justice Brandeis once stated that "the noblest of human
productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and
ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the
air to common use."52 The creator of a novel idea, unprotected by a
patent or a copyright, who publicizes it, has no remedy against those
who benefit from its use. Moreover, even where the idea or the
invention is legally protected, such protection will be limited in its
ambit. The person who first wrote a detective story may be protected
against the copying of his plot. However, he has no claim against
50. See Dannemann, supra note 48, at 1843.
51. See Ross Grantham & Charles Rickett, On the Subsidiarity of Unjust
Enrichment, 117 LAW Q. REV. 273, 273-75 (2001).
52. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918).
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those who follow his trail and write stories in the same genre, just as
Columbus would have no claim against the multitudes who benefited
from the discovery of America.
The limitations on the ambit of protection granted to recognized
interests are not confined to intellectual property. The protection of
traditional tangible property is also subject to severe limitations.
These limitations upon the interest of individuals derive from the
need to maintain a sphere of freedom to others and also from the
notion that some of the benefits are to be attributed to the very
existence of society, rather than to the individual owner. They are,
therefore, free for every member of society to enjoy. Hence, where
one person derives a benefit from a protected interest of another, no
restitution is allowed if the benefit is derived in a manner that is
beyond the ambit of protection granted to that interest. For example,
suppose that customers going to watch a show in X's building buy on
their way ice cream in Y's shop that is located nearby. Although Y
benefits from the activity that X conducts on his property, X has no
right of action against Y. The protection granted to A's ownership
does not extend to the business done by Y outside the border of X's
property.
Broadly speaking, there is no unjust enrichment where property
increases in value as a result of market fluctuation. This rule applies
irrespective of whether the increase in value results from natural
causes, from lawful transactions in property belonging to others, or
from some other activity of market participants. This rule of the law
of restitution is the counterpart of the tort rule under which, in the
opposite case, the owner has no cause of action for adverse market
fluctuations leading to a decline in the value of his property. It is a
mere damnum sine injuria.
Thus, suppose that as a result of a prolonged drought, the price
of water goes up, and consequently, the value of land with wells
having sufficient water increases, while the value of other lands
decreases. The change in relative price does not amount to a
"transfer" of property from one person to another. There is no unjust
enrichment. The same rule applies even where there is a strong
causal connection between the loss to one and the gain to another. A
possible example is a fire that destroys many houses leading to a
greater demand for building materials and builders. While house
owners lost, builders have gained. Yet, the mere fact that one person
RESTITUTION & SELF-INTEREST
benefits from the misfortune of another does not render the
enrichment "unjust," although in a very loose sense it can be
described as an enrichment at the other's expense.
In fact, the builders in the above example merely supplied a
service that alleviated the predicament of the victims. This is usually
how lawyers and doctors make their living. A major calamity may
lead to a huge increase in the income of lawyers handling tort
litigation. Needless to say, the "windfall" is not regarded as
"unjust." The enrichment is not made through the "appropriation" of
another's protected interest; it is merely caused by the need of one
person (or one group) for goods or services possessed by another
person (or another group). A similar result usually ensues even
where the change in the market conditions was brought about by a
deliberate human act, assuming it was not improper. There are
innumerable situations in which this occurs. Possible examples are:
(1) The building of a new highway between two cities-as
a result, there is an increase in the value of properties close
to the new highway and a decline in the value of properties
along the old road.
(2) An invention that enables large scale use of an
inexpensive source of energy-as a result, owners of other
sources of energy experience a decline in the value of their
property while the value of other properties (such as
factories with high energy demands) increases.
In both of these situations, the law does not intervene in order to
correct the shift in wealth. This actually reflects a broader and more
general feature of the legal system-it provides a high degree of
protection to legal rights. Typically, the owner is shielded against
unauthorized appropriation of his property, and he will also be
entitled to redress if it is negligently damaged by another. In the
field of restitution, the law ordinarily prevents the enrichment
resulting from a transfer of property from one person to another
against the owner's will. 53 However, the law usually abstains from
53. See Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the
Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
504 (1980). The owner will also usually be protected in cases in which he
agreed to the transfer of his property, but his consent was vitiated by mistake,
duress, or undue influence. See Dannemann, supra note 48.
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intervention where the loss to one or the gain to another is not a
result of the involuntary transfer of the protected interest (or in the
case of a mere damage, an injury to the interest itself) or breach of
duty owed to him, but merely reflects a change in its relative value.
54
In other words, legal protection granted to ownership is limited, and
the interest in maintaining the market value of the property normally
falls outside its scope. The value of property to the owner is not
merely dependent upon its possession or its being physically
undamaged, but also upon its price on the market; and a loss in
market value may be no less severe than physical loss or damage. If
an event such as the building of a road causes a decline in the value
of X's property and a corresponding increase in the value of Y's
property, then Y is enriched at X's expense just as he would have
been had a piece of Xs property been transferred to Y without X's
consent. In the former case, however, the law is unlikely to
intervene; while in the latter case, the involuntary shift of property
from X to Y will be viewed as an imbalance that the law must correct.
Hence, the legal system is committed to protecting existent
ownership against unauthorized appropriation or damage. It is not
committed to maintaining the present distribution of wealth which
may be disrupted in various other ways, such as fluctuation in market
values and changes in the conditions under which the market
operates.
This analysis is confined to what may be termed unjust
enrichment in the legal sense. Yet, many of the above-described
situations may give rise to unjust enrichment arguments in an
ordinary, non-technical sense,55 which may eventually have legal
54. There were, of course, social movements and social theories relating to
the justice or injustice resulting from the change in the market value of
property. A conspicuous example is the single tax movement, based on the
theories of Henry George, that advocated the confiscation, by taxation, of the
"unearned increment" in the value of land, namely the increase in the value of
land that does not derive from the owner's investment, but results from social
and economic development. See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY
406-10, 432-40 (Walter J. Black, Inc. ed., 1958) (1879).
55. Thus, the supporters of the single tax theory view the unearned
increment in the value of land as an unjust enrichment of the owner. On the
distinction between unjust enrichment in the legal and the loose, non-legal
sense, see Daniel Friedmann, Valid, Voidable, Qualified, and Non-Existing
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repercussions. Thus, where an event completely upsets the existing
market conditions, and the price of property or services supplied by
one group is immensely increased while others suffer a loss or a
diminution in the relative value of their wealth, one can expect an
outcry against profiteering (or unjust enrichment). In extreme
situations, such complaints may carry the day and lead to legal
intervention in one form or another (e.g., price control, tax on
excessive profits or upon the increase in value of certain properties,
etc.). These occasional consequences are not within the ambit of this
Article. It suffices to say that the adoption of means to alleviate such
an upset in market conditions is the exception and is usually beyond
the ambit of private law. 56 There is also no general theory, at least
not one that I am aware of-other than the vague feeling that in
extreme situations something must be done-that explains at what
point the legal system does (or ought to) intervene, and the nature
and extent of the intervention.
Modem developments have, however, tended both to increase
the range of interests that are accorded legal protection as well as
extend the zone of protection granted to traditional rights.57 For
example, the traditional approach is reflected by rules under which
tangible property is generally protected against physical damage to
the property itself.58 But the effect on the value or use of such
property resulting from dealing or interfering with property
belonging to others is usually disregarded. Thus, the destruction of a
Obligations: An Alternative Perspective on the Law of Restitution, in ESSAYS
ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 247, 251 (Andrew Burrows ed., 1991).
56. When change in the value of property results from the use of
governmental powers, payment of compensation may be justified, at least in
some situations. A conspicuous example is that of diminution in the value of
land resulting from decisions by planning authorities. See generally Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Compensation for Injuries to Land Caused by Planning
Authorities: Towards a Comprehensive Theory, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 47 (1996)
(discussing the debate about the "takings" doctrine). But arguably, under the
same reasoning, a tax should be imposed in order to deprive the owner of at
least part of the increase in the value of the land resulting from the activities of
the planning authorities. Obviously, public law regulates the payment of
compensation in these circumstances as well as the tax, if it is imposed.
57. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 1-7, at 1-32 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing background and
history of tort law) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
58. See id. at 85.
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bridge or a road does not ordinarily confer a right of action upon car
owners who are unable to use it or upon owners of a shopping center
whose businesses are detrimentally affected. The road and the
bridge are beyond the ambit of protection enjoyed by car owners and
owners of neighboring property.
59
The modem tendency is to somewhat extend the traditional
ambit of protection. There are instances in which a remedy is
granted to a property owner on the ground that the market has been
illegally interfered with. The field of securities provides some of the
most conspicuous examples. 60 The development of economic torts
has similarly expanded the ambit of protection granted to trade
interests and goodwill.61 Even a mere expectancy may gain a
measure of protection via the tort of interference with prospective
advantage.
62
These developments have their counterpart in the law of unjust
enrichment. In some situations, restitution may be had for the
appropriation of something to which another person had a mere
expectancy. 63 It is also conceivable that in some instances an act that
merely leads to the appreciation of one's property would provide a
basis for restitution. However, the protection of an expectancy is
much narrower than that granted to a legal right, and legal
intervention to correct changes in market value are no less
exceptional. The liability for unjust enrichment occasionally
imposed in this category has recently been explained as founded
upon breach of competition rules.64 A detailed discussion will not be
attempted here.
59. In tort law, this topic is usually described as pure economic loss. See
generally JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 193-203 (9th ed. 1998)
(analyzing the possible liability for loss of value or use of property resulting
from dealing with another's property).
60. See, e.g., LouIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 10 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing the rules against
market manipulation).
61. See PROSSER& KEETON, supra note 57, § 130, at 1005.
62. See id.
63. See Friedmann, supra note 53, at 535-36.
64. See Ofer Grosskopf, Protection of Competition Rules Via the Law of
Restitution, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1981 (2001).
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IV. INCIDENTAL BENEFITS
The above discussion offers an explanation for many situations
coming within the well-known rule under which no restitution can be
had for so-called "incidental benefits." 65 A person, who in pursuance
of his own interests or in performing his own duty "incidentally"
confers a benefit upon another, is usually not entitled to restitution.
This rule is discussed later in this Article.66 For the present purpose,
it suffices to point out that in typical examples, recovery is denied
simply because the nature of the benefit consists of an increase in
value without a transfer of property or labor. Thus, where a person
builds a house or plants a garden on his own property, it is generally
stated that he is not entitled to restitution of the "incidental benefit"
to his neighbors. The above discussion suggests another ground for
the absence of a right of recovery, i.e., that the benefit, which merely
consists of the increase in value of the neighbor's property, is not of
a type that the law usually corrects.
This point can be demonstrated by the case in which a person
mistakenly builds a structure on another's land and thereby also (or
"incidentally") increases the value of a neighboring property. Even
if he has a cause of action in restitution, either by virtue of a statute
or in a jurisdiction that adopts a liberal approach to the mistaken
improver,67 it is likely to be only against the owner of the land upon
which he built. No liability will be imposed upon the neighbor.
V. PURSUANCE OF SELF-INTEREST AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
RIDERS
A. Self-Interest and Freedom of Contract--General Considerations
A general principle common to both Anglo-American and
continental law is that a person who voluntarily acts in pursuance of
his own interest is not entitled to restitution from those who
incidentally benefited from his action. In French law it is stated that
65. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937).
66. See infra Section V.A.
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). This Restatement adopts a very liberal
position towards the mistaken improver subject only to the provision that the
remedy given to the improver will not unduly prejudice the owner.
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a person who acts at his own risk with a view of obtaining a personal
advantage (agi 6t ses risque et pirils en vue d'un avantage
personnel)68 is not entitled to restitution. A similar rule is provided
under section 106 of the first Restatement.
69
Consequently, the recipients of benefits that are derived from an
act done by another in pursuance of his own interest may keep their
enrichment although initially they were not entitled to the benefits.
An analysis of this principle provides insight into the limits of
restitution as well as to some of the pressures towards its expansion.
Let us consider the following examples:
(1) Xplans to build an entertainment park that is likely to
increase the value of the land in the vicinity.
(2) A mine owned by X has been flooded. Pumping the
water will also drain an adjoining mine owned by Y.
(3) X owns property on a riverbank. In order to prevent
flooding, X intends to build a dike that will inevitably
protect the property of his neighbor Y.
In all of these examples, X can negotiate with those who are
likely to benefit from his intended activity. No difficulty arises if
they agree to remunerate X or contribute towards his expenses.
However, if they decline to participate, X is faced with a choice; X
may give up his plan or proceed with the knowledge that it will
benefit others, who are, in a sense, free riders. This element is
common to all the above examples and indeed, as we have seen, to
all human activities that have this "spill over."
Another relevant consideration is concerned with the principle
of freedom of contract. This principle has two aspects. The positive
aspect relates to the power of the parties to create rights and
68. See TERRE ET AL., supra note 34, at 901.
69. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 23
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002); GOFF & JONES, supra note 18, at 58-61; PETER
D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 741-73
(1990); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees
From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1597 (1974); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1975);
John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1409
(1974); John D. McCamus, The Self-Serving Intermeddler and the Law of
Restitution, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 517, 518-19 (1978).
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obligations binding upon themselves. The negative aspect relates to
the party's freedom from obligation for benefits conferred upon him
without his consent.70 The negative aspect of freedom of contract is
essential for the maintenance of its positive aspect and for the
operation of the whole market economy. Resources are limited. The
negative aspect of freedom of contract means that a person will not
be required to spend resources on goods and services that he did not
agree to acquire. A person's resources are at his disposal and he is
free to use them to make the contracts he is interested in with those
parties with whom he wishes to transact. According to this
reasoning, if X demands payment from Y for a service that he
provided without Y's request, X infringes Y's negative freedom of
contract. In Anglo-American law, the protection granted against
such infringement is reflected in the rule against unsolicited benefits,
the provider of which is usually termed "volunteer." 71 Thus, a recent
decision stated that "restitution should not be granted to create a
liability which the plaintiff could not achieve by bargaining. 72
There is considerable overlap between the pursuance of the self-
interest rule and the rule relating to unsolicited benefits; but they are
not identical. The pursuance of self-interest emphasizes the
plaintiff s position. The fact that he acted in his own interest suffices
to compensate him and he should not be allowed to get additional
benefits by taxing others. The unsolicited benefits rule considers the
situation from the defendant's point of view, and concludes that he
should not be liable for benefits conferred upon him without his
consent. French law emphasizes the self-interest rule even though it
recognizes the institution of negotiorum gestio, which allows
recovery for unsolicited benefits. 73 Anglo-American law, which did
not adopt the institution of negotiorum gestio, stresses the unsolicited
70. See Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann, From "Classical" to Modern
Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 3, 11-12 (Jack
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); Nili Cohen, Pre-Contractual Duties:
Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW 25 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995).
71. See GEORGE E. PALMER, 2 THE LAW OF RESTITUTION ch. 10, at 358
(1978).
72. Berry & Gould v. Berry, 757 A.2d 108, 118 (Md. 2000).
73. See Samuel J. Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, in 10 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 17, 17-21 (Ernst von Caemmerer
& Peter Schlechtriem eds., 1984).
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benefits rule, though the fact that the plaintiff acted in his own
interest is sometimes referred to as an additional ground for denying
recovery. 74 For our purpose, it suffices to point out that the rule
which denies recovery for unsolicited benefits is broader than the one
relating to the pursuance of the self-interest, since it is conceivable
that a person who does not act in pursuance of the self-interest would
confer an unsolicited benefit on someone else. In Anglo-American
law, his claim for restitution may be denied by virtue of the
unsolicited benefits rule. Under French law recovery may be
allowed if the conditions for negotiorum gestio are met.75 But in
many other situations, in which the two rules overlap, they would
lead to the same result, namely, denial of the right of recovery.
We may now address the examples given above. Example (1),
in which an entrepreneur plans to build an entertainment park, is
easy. It is concerned with a new project, an attempt to augment
one's wealth. Surely there is nothing harsh in having the
entrepreneur face the choice of either making the investment or
giving it up. If according to his calculation the enterprise is
attractive and profitable, he is likely to proceed with it. His expected
gains are sufficient to compensate him, and there is no need to grant
him an additional return on his investment, nor is there sufficient
justification to allow him to impose a tax upon others. Indeed, as
already pointed out, the benefit is not of a type for which restitution
is normally granted. It merely consists of a change in market value
of the neighbor's property, and this benefit may usually be enjoyed
free of charge.
A related idea, sometimes pursued, is that recovery based on
unjust enrichment should be conditional not only upon the
defendant's enrichment but also upon the plaintiff's loss. In the self-
interest situations the plaintiff arguably suffered no loss. He got
what he paid for, and he ought to have no ground for complaint. It
should, however, be emphasized that the denial of recovery is not
based on the absence of a loss. Even if the entertainment park
project ends in a loss to X, he has no claim against the landowners
who "incidentally" benefited through X's venture.
74. See id. at 17-36.
75. See id. at 17-21.
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This analysis can be applied to the mines and the dike examples.
The mines example is based upon Ulmer v. Farnsworth,76 in which
recovery was denied. The first Restatement of Restitution adopted
this result and reached the same conclusion in the case of the dike.
77
A similar conclusion was reached under French law.78 The person
who drained the mine or built the dike must have considered the
expense to be worth it to him. Such a result was indeed reached in
the more recent case of Knaus v. Dennler,79 in which the plaintiffs
purchased a lakefront plot of land that included more than half of the
earthen dam that contained the lake. They discovered holes in the
dam and were advised that the whole dam should be reconstructed.8 °
The plaintiffs met with other property owners abutting the lake in
order to agree on what should be done.8' No agreement was reached
and the defendants objected to the reconstruction.8 2 Nevertheless,
the plaintiffs hired a contractor to do the work, but he could only
reconstruct the portion of the dam owned by the plaintiff as the
defendants objected to the reconstruction of their portion of the
dam.83  The plaintiffs' claim for proportionate sharing of the
expenses was dismissed on the ground that they instructed the work
to be done notwithstanding the defendants' opposition.84  The
plaintiffs' act therefore "fall[s] into the category of 'officiously' or
'gratuitously' conferred benefit for which quasi-contractual relief is
not available in Illinois." 85 It should be noted, however, that the case
can be explained on the ground that the part of the dam that was
reconstructed was on the plaintiffs' property, and was in fact owned
76. 15 A. 65 (Me. 1888); see also Berry & Gould, 757 A.2d at 116 (stating
that plaintiff's restitution claim would be denied where the benefit to the
defendant was intentionally conferred and the parties were in a position to
bargain about compensation).
77. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937).
78. See FRANCOIS GORIt, L'ENRICHISSEMENT AUX DEPENS D'AUTRUI 71
(1949).
79. 525 N.E.2d 207 (I11. App. 1988). For notes on this case, see KENNETH
H. YORK ET AL., REMEDIES-CASES AND MATERIALS 323-26 (6th ed. 1999).
80. See Knaus, 525 N.E.2d at 208.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at210.
85. Id.
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by the plaintiffs, 86 while the part of the dam on the defendants'
property was not reconstructed, and finally it is not clear whether the
need for reconstruction was crucial or whether it actually prevented
flooding that would have damaged the defendants' property.
Still, it is always possible to point out in this type of situation
that the plaintiff got what he wanted. Why, then, should his
neighbors contribute when the person who incurred the expense has
sufficient incentive to proceed on his own?
But this line of reasoning has its limits. It may be convincing in
the context of a new investment (e.g., the building of an
entertainment park). However, it loses much of its force in the case
of salvage of existing property (the mines example)87 or the attempt
to prevent the loss of existing property (the dike example). A person
who considers a new investment usually has a number of alternatives
each with different prospects of gains and risks. Such a choice has
always been considered "free." The question of salvage or the
protection of an existing interest is distinguishable. It presents a
choice between watching the loss of existing property or conferring
an undeserved benefit on another.
The situation is not within the ambit of economic duress. But
the issue is close and modem developments in the area of duress are
relevant since they indicate the increasing tendency of the law to take
these types of pressures into account.
88
86. The question may thus arise whether an owner of a dam or part of it
does owe a duty to keep it in good repair. Cf VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES §§
28.36-.44 (1954 & Supp. 1962) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY]
(explaining the duty of support which a landowner may owe to neighboring
land, particularly section 28.42). If this is the case, then the claim against the
defendants should not have been for the proportionate share of the cost, but to
order them to reconstruct the part of the dam on their land if reconstruction
was indeed necessary.
87. Arguably, this is not a case of salvage but of improvement of existing
property. The distinction between improvement and salvage, while in some
cases clear, is occasionally difficult to draw. Thus, the rescuing of valuable
property that fell into a lake and lies at its bottom can be seen as an
improvement (the property existed and is more valuable outside the water than
lying inside it). Yet, there can be little doubt that this is actually a case of
salvage. See also infra note 156.
88. See GOFF & JONES, supra note 18, at 327-47. Another term that is
occasionally used to describe economic pressure is "business compulsion."
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Also relevant is the increasing emphasis upon the idea of good
faith. It may be asked whether there is a stage in which declining to
participate in a salvage operation while taking advantage of its fruits
will be regarded as an unfair use of one's freedom. Had Y (in the
dike example) been the sole person whose property was jeopardized,
Xwould have had no business to protect it against Y's will. But Xis
not an indifferent bystander. His own property is at stake and Y may
take advantage of the situation notably if the value of X's property is
much higher than his own. Hence, if only Y's property was at risk he
might have built the dike himself. But under the circumstances he
declines to share the expenses since the prospect of a free ride is too
difficult to resist. In fact, the end result in this type of situation (if
restitution is not allowed) may well be that the dike will not be built
at all. The building expenses may exceed the value of the property
of a single owner, and even if they do not, an owner of one piece of
property may be unwilling to incur a large expense without being
assured that others, who equally benefit from it, will share the
burden.
8 9
Extreme situations of this type are often within the province of
public law. The defense of a country cannot be left to negotiations
among those who benefit from it, and government machinery is
employed to recruit an army and to impose taxes to shoulder the
burden and prevent free riding. Indeed, public law is often better
suited to deal with such issues, notably where a great variety of
interests are likely to benefit and where a large number of people are
involved. But public law cannot deal with everything. The issues
are likely to remain in the sphere of private law when the interests
are specific and not widely dispersed.
See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 319
(4th ed. 1998). The situations discussed are not usually within the category of
economic duress because the pressure exerted upon the actor does not
ordinarily stem from the defendants (the parties who enjoy the benefit of
actor's act). However, the category of payment of a common debt, discussed
infra, is actually classified in Anglo-American law as "legal compulsion." See
infra Section V.C.
89. But see AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 86, § 28.36-.46
(regarding the question of ownership of the dike and whether the owner is
under a duty to maintain it).
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In the Sections that follow I shall examine, with a view of
searching the underlying principles, a number of situations, in which
private law offers a solution.
B. General Average
Under maritime law, the rules as to general average apply where
in the course of a voyage the ship and its cargo face a common
danger and, in order to contend with it, part of the property is
sacrificed in order to save the rest.90 If these conditions are met, the
interests saved must contribute towards the loss of the interests
sacrificed. These rules recognized by maritime nations for thousands
of years can be viewed as a peculiarity of maritime law. They are,
however, based on a just and reasonable policy. The law of general
average contains the two elements that combine to create exceptions
to the rule denying recovery for unsolicited benefits or acts made in
pursuance of self-interest. There is an expenditure or sacrifice by
one person to protect against a common danger. In addition, the
interests involved are very close. They participate in a common
venture. There is a kind of community of interests in which the
sacrifice of one benefits all others.
C. Indemnity and Contribution Between Personal and "Real"
Co-obligors
Where a number of persons are under a common obligation to
the same creditor, so that each is liable for the whole amount and
payment by one discharges the others, the debtor who pays more
than his share is entitled to indemnity or contribution from the others.
This rule is common both to Anglo-American and to continental
law.
91
The debtor who discharges the debt acts in his own interest. In
French terminology, he acts dans sa propre cause et intiret. But this
does not exclude his right to contribution. On the contrary, the fact
that he was legally bound to make the payment is often referred to as
the very reason that justifies restitution.
90. See GOFF & JONES, supra note 18, at 427-29.
91. See Daniel Friedmann & Nili Cohen, Adjustment Among Multiple
Debtors, in 10 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § § 11-
5 to -13 (1991).
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The elements already mentioned in the context of general
average are present in this case as well. The plaintiff, being legally
liable, acts under great pressure. It is inevitable that the act would
simultaneously benefit the other debtors who are released from their
obligation towards the creditor. The additional element relates to the
"closeness" of the interests. It is, thus, not surprising that the law of
contribution developed from the situation in which the debtors acted
in concert; for example where two sureties signed the same bond.
But in a leading case decided in England as early as 1787, the court
held that the right of contribution is to be extended to sureties who
guaranteed the same debt by signing separate documents. 92 Indeed,
the requirement of pre-existing relations between the debtors has
been whittled down and very little remains from the idea that in order
to allow restitution there should be some kind of "community"
between the debtors or that they should at least be subject to a
"common demand. 93 The fact that the debtors are liable for the
same debt suffices in order to create the necessary community of
interest, even in the absence of pre-existing relations between them.
In addition, restitution is ordinarily granted to a person who pays
another's debt in order to prevent the seizure of his property or to
discharge a lien upon it.94 The position of a person whose property is
subject to a charge or a lien, which secures the debt of another, is
similar to that of a surety. 95 Though he is not personally liable, his
property (or property in which he has an interest) may be taken in
satisfaction of the debt.96 Where such a "real" surety discharges the
obligation, he is entitled to contribution from other "real" and
personal sureties (he is obviously entitled to indemnity from the
principal debtors). Again, the "real" surety acts in pursuance of his
own interest, namely to protect his property which is mortgaged as a
security for another's debt. His act inevitably benefits the other
92. See Dering v. Winchelsea, 126 Eng. Rep. 1276 (Ex. 1787).
93. See generally Friedmann & Cohen, supra note 91, §§ 11.10-.20
(explaining the strong tendency to diminish the importance of the distinction
between various categories of common obligations and the blurring of the line
between them).
94. See Richard Sutton, Payment of Debts Charged upon Property, in
ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 71 (Andrew Burrows ed., 1991).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id
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debtors, and in this type of situation pursuance of self-interest does
not defeat restitution but on the contrary, it provides the very
justification for allowing it.
D. Other Instances of Payment ofAnother's Debt in Pursuance of
Self-Interest
There are a variety of situations in which a person, who is not
liable for the debt of another, has nevertheless an interest in
discharging the debt.98 A possible example is that in which a number
of persons are involved in an accident and each denies liability, or
the case of a number of insurance companies that insured the same
interest but each claims that its policy does not cover the loss. One
of the parties involved decides to settle the claim in order to avoid
the risk of paying a higher amount. It then transpires that he was not
liable at all. Under the traditional English law, such a payor is
regarded as a mere "volunteer" who has no claim against the real
debtors. 99 He had a choice. He could have negotiated with the real
debtors and if they declined to pay, he could have allowed the issue
to be determined in court. If he found it more advantageous to pay,
he had no claim against the real debtors who "incidentally" benefited
from his payment. This approach disregards the pressure to which
the payor is sometimes exposed and the unfairness in permitting the
real debtors to get a free ride and reap the benefit of the payor's
predicament. English law still maintains this position, 00 and
legislative intervention was required in order to remedy the situation,
at least in certain cases.' 0' The modem approach in American law is
more liberal and tends to relax the traditional rule and allow the
payor, who has an interest in discharging the debt or a moral duty to
do so, to recover from the real debtors. 10 2  This is in line with
98. See Daniel Friedmann & Nili Cohen, Payment of Another's Debt, in 10
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § 11.1 (1991).
99. See id. § 11.44.
100. See Stott v. W. Yorkshire Rd. Car Co., [1971] 2 Q.B. 651 (C.A.)
(modified by statute, see infra note 101); Legal & Gen. Assurance Soc. v.
Drake Ins. Co., [1992] 2 W.L.R. 51 (C.A.).
101. See The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act, 1978, c. 47 (Eng.); see also
Friedmann & Cohen, supra note 91, §§ 11-21 to -22 (discussing the
developments in English law).
102. See Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 655 P.2d 544
(Okla. 1982); 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.6, at
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continental law, which generally recognizes the right of restitution of
one who pays another's debt.
103
There are a number of factors that support this approach. The
enrichment of the debtor is obvious. There is also no interference
with his choice as to the allocation of his resources since he was in
any event liable to pay his debt. The only difference, from the
debtor's point of view, lies in the personality of the creditor. But
with the almost free assignability of debts, a change of creditors is a
possibility that the debtor must reckon with.
E. Co-Ownership, Joint Interests, Common Funds, Derivative and
Class Actions
This category includes a number of broad exceptions to the rule,
embodied in section 106 of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution,
under which a person who acts in order to protect his own property
and thereby "incidentally" protects the property of others is not
entitled to restitution.' 0 4 Under section 105 of the Restatement, a co-
owner who takes a reasonably necessary action for the preservation
or protection of the co-owned subject matter is entitled to
contribution, enforced by a lien, upon the share of the other co-
owner. 105 A similar approach ought, in principle, to apply in other
instances of limited interest, like expenditure by a mortgagee for the
protection of the mortgaged property. 0 6 In England, a co-tenant's
claim of contribution for necessary expenditure was dismissed in
Leigh v. Dickeson,107 though the court stated that the repairs and
improvements would be taken into account in a suit for partition.
The result is unjustified.
It is of course necessary to distinguish between improvements
and reasonable expenditures that are essential for the preservation of
405-06 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 26 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
103. See Friedmann & Cohen, supra note 98, § 10-9, at 10.
104. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937).
105. See id. § 105(1).
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 24 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). Complex issues arise where the interests
differ in nature, as in the case of a life tenant and a remainderman. See
MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 69, at 246-48.
107. [1884-1885] 15 Q.B. 60 (C.A.).
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the joint interest. In the latter category contribution should be
available. 108
In order to recover, the co-owner who made the expenditure
ought not to have acted officiously. Furthermore, except in the case
of an emergency, which makes consultation with the other parties
involved impractical, the co-owner is expected to request their
participation.10 9 However, in this category, as well as in other
situations in which the plaintiffs right is founded upon self-interest,
objection by the defendant is not necessarily fatal to restitution. This
means that the plaintiff is relieved of the choice of either making an
expenditure that would inevitably benefit a person who will not share
the burden or suffering a loss. It also means that the defendant is
deprived of the prospect of a free ride.
This approach has been extended to a considerable number of
situations, some of which are very important. They include
derivative action by a stockholder, class actions, and a number of
other situations of common interest. The typical model upon which
recovery is predicated is the existence of a plaintiffs interest and a
reasonable expenditure he made in order to protect his interest in
circumstances where the expenditure must also necessarily protect
the interest of others. An additional element that may be required is
a lack of any practical possibility of getting others' cooperation.
There must also be a sufficient proximity between the interests
involved. It is this "community of interests" which justifies the
recovery and enjoins free riding. Admittedly, a precise definition of
such a community of interests is lacking and marking the line
between the situations, in which the interests are regarded as
108. With regard to the difficulty of distinguishing between improvement
and preservation, compare supra note 87 and infra note 156. In the case of co-
ownership, the enrichment of one co-owner at the expense of another may be
prevented even where the benefit is in the form of improvements. The
improver can sue for partition in which case many courts take the improvement
into account. Where the property is physically divided, the improver will have
the part of the property on which the improvement was made. If the property
is sold, the investment (to the extent that it increased the value of the property)
is taken into account when dividing the proceeds. See MADDAUGH &
MCCAMUS, supra note 69, at 744-47.
109. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 105(1)(a).
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sufficiently close to permit restitution and those in which they are
not, is often extremely difficult to draw."
0
The derivative action can be regarded as an extension of the co-
ownership rule adapted to the corporate environment. The
corporation is owned by its shareholders. If the machinery designed
to protect the common interest fails, an action by an individual
shareholder may be appropriate. The act may be undertaken without
the consent and often against the wishes of the other shareholders;
but it is for the benefit of the common interest. The shareholder,
who in pursuance of his own interest ultimately protects the interests
of the whole group, is entitled to reimbursement from their "common
property," i.e., the corporation." ' 1
Such a "community of interests" was also recognized where a
bondholder succeeded in a claim to set aside a fraudulent transfer of
property out of which he as well as other bondholders could satisfy
their claim. 112 The analogy to co-ownership, or more precisely to the
limited proprietary interest situations, is strongest where the
bondholders (or for that matter, any group of creditors) have a
proprietary right in the property to be salvaged. Arguably though,
the same approach might apply to unsecured creditors, where one of
them makes an expenditure that salvages property out of which the
other creditors will eventually be paid. This idea has been further
extended to a great variety of situations in which the expenditure
created a "common fund," as in the case of class actions. The
"common fund," which is to be distributed among a certain group,
indicates the existence of a community of interests. Those who
benefit from the fund are therefore required to participate in the costs
of its creation, which are deducted from the fund. These costs were
sometimes awarded to the party who initiated the litigation but often
they inure to the benefit of the lawyers who conducted the
proceedings.113
Recovery has been allowed in other situations where, though a
common fund barely existed, the interests were regarded as
1 10. Cf RESTATEMENT (THuRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
30 cmts. (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2002).
111. See Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1975] 1 All E.R. 849 (C.A.); MADDAUGH &
MCCAMUS, supra note 69, at 770.
112. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
113. See the articles by Dawson, supra note 69.
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sufficiently close to warrant restitution. Some of the decisions went
too far and were rightly criticized, notably where the real beneficiary
of the liberal approach was the lawyer hired by one of the parties."
14
A detailed discussion of these developments will not be attempted
here. For our purposes it suffices to point out that the basic idea is
sound. Where one person in order to preserve his own property
makes an expenditure, which necessarily protects other interests that
are sufficiently proximate, recovery to prevent the unjust enrichment
of the free riders should be allowed. This idea, which originated in
the maritime law of general average, is manifested in quite a number
of modem rules some of which were discussed above." 5 The main
difficulty lies in defining the proximity of interests, which makes us
view the enrichment of one through the loss or sacrifice of the other
as "unjust." As is often the case, it is easy to identify extreme
situations.
A litigant whose effort and expenditure secured a leading
decision which modified the law has obviously no claim against
those who benefit from the new ruling. On the other hand, the co-
owner who incurs expenses to successfully defend the co-owned
property1 6 should clearly be entitled to contribution from the other
co-owner. Between these two extremes there is a whole gamut of
possibilities, some of which are likely to present borderline
situations.
F. Co-Heirs
Ordinarily, we may expect that expenses relating to the
protection of the decedent's estate would be paid by the
administrator out of the estate. In this way the expenditure, which
actually benefits the heirs, is in fact distributed among them.
However, examples can be found in which some of the heirs who
acted in pursuance of their interest in preserving the estate or
obtaining a share in it incurred expenses that also benefited the
others. In Felton v. Finely, 17 a lawyer was hired by two heirs to
114. See id.
115. See supra Section V.C-E.
116. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 105(2).
117. 209 P.2d 899 (Idaho 1949); see also PALMER, supra note 102, at 420-
21. The claim of a lawyer who represented one of the heirs in a successful
litigation, to be paid by the heirs who did not hire his services, was also denied
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contest a will and was promised fifty percent of the recovery. The
contest was successful and as a result the estate passed by intestacy
to the heirs, including those who refused to participate in the
litigation. 118 The lawyer's claim against the heirs who did not retain
him was rightly dismissed. 19 A person who provides goods or
services under a contract and who receives the contractual
consideration is not entitled to additional payment from third parties
that benefited from his performance. In fact, the person who
provided this benefit is not the one who was paid to supply the goods
or the services but the one who bought them. Thus, in the Felton v.
Finely type of situation the question that arises is whether the heirs
who retained the lawyer should be entitled to contribution from the
other heirs who got part of that which would have otherwise been
given to the legatee under the will. In my view, the reasoning of the
co-ownership situation ought to apply. 120 The interests of the parties
are sufficiently close to justify contribution from those heirs who
have objected to contesting the will, yet after the contest proved
successful, took advantage of the result. 121
A different conclusion was reached in Feick v. Fleener122 in
somewhat different circumstances. There the decedent, who died in
in Domenella v. Domenella, 513 N.E.2d 17 (I11. App. Ct. 1987). But see Estate
of Pfoertner, 700 N.E.2d 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (allowing the lawyer's
claim). Under the Restatement, such a claim should be denied. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30, at 98-99 (Preliminary
Draft No. 4, 2002).
118. See Felton, 209 P.2d at 899.
119. Seeid.
120. If the heirs who hired the lawyer are entitled to contribution from the
other heirs, the lawyer may try to reach these heirs via his agreement with
those who hired him. For example, if the lawyer's contingent fee is normally
thirty percent, he may ask the heir who hires him for sixty percent on the
ground that this heir will get contribution from the others. There are, however,
limits to such possibilities. The contracting heir may not agree to a percentage
that is too high, even if he is likely to get contribution. In addition, the right of
contribution is in any event limited to the reasonable expenditure. The court
may therefore disallow contribution for the excessive part of the lawyer's fees.
121. The heirs acquired their share of the inheritance upon the will being
held invalid. There was no need for an act of acceptance on their part.
Consequently, taking their share did not amount to "acceptance," in the
technical sense, of the services provided in contesting the will.
122. 653 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1981).
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1976, had been adjudicated incompetent in 1969.123 While
incompetent, the decedent married S.R. After his death, S.R. and her
daughter asserted claims superior to the interests of the legatees. 124
In 1971, two of the legatees retained a lawyer to annul the marriage
and promised to pay him twenty-five percent of all monies inherited
by them as well as by other nieces and nephews of the testator and
their descendants. 125 In 1972, the lawyer succeeded in obtaining
annulment of the marriage and the New York State Supreme Court
awarded him substantial fees for his services in connection with the
litigation. 126 The daughter's claim was settled in 1978, and the
Supreme Court awarded the lawyer a fee of $37,500 from the
estate. 127 The estate was distributed, and the appellants paid the
lawyer twenty-five percent of the whole amount distributed-in
accordance with their agreement.128 Their claim for contribution was
dismissed. 129 The court applied the New York rule under which
parties are not obligated to pay the fees of attorneys whom they have
not retained, and a party who retains a lawyer's services is not
entitled to contribution from others who benefit from those
services. 130 The court also held that no "fund" was created by the
lawyer's efforts.13 ' He played no role in creating the estate nor did
he have any role in creating the defendant's status as beneficiaries. 132
He merely helped to eliminate competing claims (of S.R. and her
daughter). 1
33
The distinction between creating a fund and protecting it is
somewhat tenuous. An heir who acts inofficiously and reasonably in
order to preserve the inheritance and succeeds in doing so, should, in
principle, be reimbursed out of the estate, so that his reasonable
expenses will in fact be borne by the heirs who benefited from his
act.
123. Seeid. at71.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 72.
126. See id. at 73.
127. See id. at 74.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 77.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 78.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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The denial of restitution in Feick v. Fleener can be explained on
the ground that the main service (annulment of the marriage) was
rendered when the testator was still alive. 134 At this stage, an act by
an individual heir to eliminate competing claims may seem as
benefiting merely the testator and in any event too early to involve
the other heirs. The court also pointed out that had S.R. predeceased
the testator, the parties would have received the same distributions
even without the annulment.' 35  This point is not convincing,
however, as she did not predecease the testator. 136 In addition, where
services (legal or others) are to be paid-and are actually paid-out
of the estate, it is doubtful whether an heir who promises a lawyer an
additional remuneration can require that those who opposed it will
share the additional burden.
G. Performance of Contractual Obligation That Benefits Third
Parties
Suppose that X contracts with Y for the performance of work or
the supply of goods. X performs his part of the bargain, and it
transpires that X's performance inured to the benefit of Z because Y
gave the goods to Z or because the work was performed on Z's
property and improved it. Can X recover from Z? The obvious
answer is that if Y paid X in accordance with their contract, X cannot
have an additional right against Z. In fact, it is Y rather than X who
provided the benefit to Z. Y acquired the goods or the services from
X and delivered them to Z. Z may be liable for the goods or services
under a contract with Y. In the absence of a contract, or if the
contract failed, Z may be liable in restitution. In any event, Z's
liability is to Y, who supplied the goods or the service, even though Y
did it via X.
But suppose that Y breached his contract with X and failed to
pay him. Can the unpaid X recover from Z on the ground of the
134. See id. at 72.
135. See id. at 78.
136. Indeed, this argument can be raised with regard to any precautionary
measure. After the event it may transpire that the precaution was unnecessary.
In such a case it is arguable that the other party derived no benefit and was thus
not "enriched." But if subsequently it becomes clear that the precautionary
measure did avert a loss, the benefit received by the other party becomes
evident.
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latter's enrichment? The problem is an old one and has an
interesting history. In Roman law, it arose where a slave or a son of
a head of a family carried a business or entered into legal
transactions. 137 The obligations were usually discharged out of a
fund (peculium) that the son or slave had at his disposal. 138 The
master was not liable under Roman law for these transactions, so no
claim could be had against him if the fund was insufficient.
139
Where, however, the master benefited from the transaction while the
other party remained unpaid, liability was imposed via actio de in
rem verso, to the extent of the master's enrichment. 140 This was the
action, which was resurrected by the French Cour de Cassation in the
case of Boudier, to support the claim of the unpaid vendor (who
contracted with the tenant) against the landlord. 141 While French law
adopted the in rem verso claim, subject to certain limitations, other
continental legal systems, notably the German and the Swiss,
rejected it. 142 Anglo-American law has traditionally sided with those
who deny the claim.' 43 The general rule in Anglo-American law is
that a person, who in performing his contractual obligation conferred
a benefit upon a third person, has no right of recovery against the
third party. 144  The result is often described as resting upon the
broader principle under which a person who acts in pursuance of his
own interest is not entitled to restitution for the "incidental" benefits
137. See AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SONS, SLAVES, AND FREEDMEN IN ROMAN
COMMERCE 31-39 (1987).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 49.
140. See id. at 66-88 (discussing the peculium arrangement and the actio de
in rem verso).
141. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Nicholas, supra note
26, at 622-23.
142. This follows from the requirement that enrichment be direct and
restitution must follow performance lines. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text; see also Dannemann, supra note 48, at 1859-60.
143. See Pan Ocean Shipping Co. v. Creditcorp Ltd., [1994] 1 W.L.R. 161
(H.L.); Jack Beatson, Restitution and Contract: Non-Cumul?, in 1
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 83, 108-13 (2000); Friedmann, supra note
55, at 273-75; see also Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the
Subcontractor: Has Restitution Jumped Off Dawson's Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REV.
2055 (2001). Professor Rendleman supports a direct claim by the unpaid
subcontractor against the owner, subject to a number of restrictions.
144. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 106, 110 (1937).
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conferred thereby upon others. An additional explanation is that a
person has a choice either to enter into a contract or decline to do so.
In making his decision, he can weigh all the advantages (usually the
promises made by the other party) against the cost and the risks. If
he voluntarily chooses to enter into the contract, there is no reason to
offer him additional remuneration by taxing a third party who did not
agree to assume any obligation towards him. Under this reasoning,
the claim of the party who supplied the goods or services (X) should
be against his contracting partner (Y). X should not be given
preference over Y's other creditors by being allowed to sue Z. The
claim against Z is part of Y's assets, and if Y is insolvent Y's assets
should be divided among his creditors in accordance with the rules
pertaining to insolvency.
I shall not discuss this issue in detail. For our purpose, it is
sufficient to point out that this situation differs from the other
instances of pursuance of self-interest I previously discussed, 145 in
that in the present case there is usually no free ride and no unjust
enrichment. Normally Z pays Y for whatever Y supplied via X. The
argument that Z is unjustly enriched arises if Z is trying to avoid
payment to Y and Y does not sue him, while X remains unpaid. Even
in such circumstances, most cases reject a direct claim by X against
Z.14 6 Yet some cases allow recovery 147 and many states adopted
mechanic's lien statutes that do in fact enable the subcontractor to
recover from the owner. 148
I would still argue that in the absence of a statute, the position of
X should not differ from that of any other creditor of Y. Most legal
systems enable the garnishment or attachment of debts. 149 X should
145. See supra Section V.B-E.
146. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Sard, 297 A.2d 889 (Me. 1972); Berry & Gould
v. Berry, 757 A.2d 108, 116 (Md. 2000); see also J.R. Kemper, Building and
Construction Contracts, 62 A.L.R.3d 288 (1975); Palmer, supra note 102, at
423; Rendleman, supra note 143, at 2065-66.
147. See, e.g., Andy's Glass Shops Inc. v. Leelenau Realty, 363 N.E.2d 601
(Ohio 1977); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 29 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2002); Rendleman, supra note 143,
at 2070-72.
148. However, under these statutes certain formal requirements must usually
be met in order for the lien to apply. See Rendleman, supra note 143, at 2068-
73.
149. See 6 AM. JUR. 2DAttachment and Garnishment § 110 (1999).
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therefore be allowed to attach the debt owed by Z to Y.' 50 But this
possibility is open to all other creditors of Y, and in this respect X
does not enjoy any special advantage.
There is also a group of agency cases, reminiscent of the old in
rem verso action, in which recovery against the principal is based
upon his enrichment from an invalid contract that the agent purported
to make in his name.' 51 The typical situation is that in which an
agent, a director, or an official, in exceeding his authority, contracts
with another party in the name of the principal. The contract is not
binding upon the principal (unless ratified). Yet, if the principal is
enriched by the other party's performance, he is usually liable in
restitution. The claim has often been allowed not only when the
principal received money or goods (which can be returned), but also
when he received services that were of value to him.
152
Nevertheless, the typical case is more akin to mistake. The other
party rendered performance believing that the contract is valid.'
53
Indeed, had the party known that the agent acted without authority,
he may well be treated as a volunteer.
H. Other Situations
A major issue is whether the categories discussed above such as
co-ownership, co-debtors, and common funds, in which contribution
is allowed, are preclusive. I would argue that they are not. The
categories are founded on basic concepts of fairness and when
150. The garnishment or attachment of debts may depend on formal
requirements, which may differ from one legal system to another. Issues
relating to their liberalization is beyond the scope of this Article.
151. See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Int'l Marathons, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 58
(Mass. 1984); Midland Diesel Serv. v. Sivertson, 307 N*W.2d 555 (N.D. 1981)
(concluding that the defendant was unjustly enriched by retaining a truck at the
expense of the seller).
152. See Boston Athletic Ass'n, 462 N.E.2d at 58; GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE,
ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO RESTITUTION ch.7 (1977); see also RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 111(2). Cf Midland Diesel Serv., 307 N.W.2d at
555; Craven-Ellis v. Canons Ltd., [1936] 2 K.B. 403 (C.A.); Rover Int'l v.
Cannon Film Sales, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 912 (C.A.).
153. The rule that precludes a direct claim by one party to a contract (the
subcontractor X in the situation discussed in supra Section V.G) against a third
party (the owner Z) does not apply where the contract between X and Y (the
main contractor) is vitiated on such grounds as duress, misrepresentation, or
mistake. See Friedmann, supra note 55, at 268-70.
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similar conditions can be found in other situations, which call for a
similar result, a remedy should be available. The issue arises
whenever a person must act in order to protect or salvage his own
interest and thereby inevitably preserves the property of others
whose interest are closely interlocked with his own. A simple
example will illustrate this point: Suppose X and Y deposit valuables
in a safe that is carried by a boat. The safe falls into the water. X,
whose valuables are worth more than those of Y, is interested in
salvaging the property; but Y declines to share the cost. X pays for
the salvage, and after the safe is pulled out of the water, Y takes his
property. Strictly speaking, this example is not within any of the
categories discussed above. Yet, I submit that X should be entitled to
contribution from y.154 He would have clearly been so entitled had
the property been co-owned by both. It is assumed, however, that
each owned separate valuables. Nevertheless, the analogy to the co-
owners situation is compelling. Although ownership was separate,
there was a community of interest that justifies contribution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The principle that a person who acts in pursuance of his own
interests is not entitled to restitution from those who benefited from
his act has been extensively applied in order to restrict the
application of the broad principle of unjust enrichment. Professor
Dawson described the actor as a self-serving intermeddler,
presumably to strengthen his criticism of those decisions, which
nonetheless allowed him to recover. 155  The term "self-serving
intermeddler" may be appropriate when a person acts with a view of
creating new wealth or acquiring new interests. It is less appropriate
when the actor tries to avoid a common loss or salvage something
from a disaster that befell upon him and others.
There are a number of considerations that operate to restrict the
pursuance of the self-interest principle, in particular:
(1) Was the act necessary in order to salvage an interest or
avert a loss, or was it an attempt to create new wealth? This
is an essential element. Ordinarily there is no room for
154. The amount of contribution should be in proportion to the relative value
of the properties ofXand Y.
155. See Dawson's position as reflected in his articles cited supra note 69.
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contribution for acts done for the purpose of creating new
wealth. Admittedly, the distinction between the two
categories is not always clear and borderline cases are
conceivable. 156 But in many instances it is obvious that the
act was done under great pressure to protect an existing
interest in circumstances that are close to economic
duress. 1
5 7
(2) How close are the actor and the parties who seek a free
ride and wish to enjoy the actor's expenditure free of
charge?
(3) How clear and incontrovertible is the benefit that these
parties received?
It is obvious that the case for restitution is the strongest where
the act was done under great pressure, the parties that enjoyed the
benefit are closely related to the act, and the benefit they derived is
substantial and incontrovertible. In such a situation, the law is likely
to impose a limit upon the possibility of free riding.
We may conclude by reverting to the cases of draining of
adjoining mines1 58 and building of the dike. 159  In the adjoining
mines case, it seems to me that the plaintiff should be entitled to
contribution, though he may be required to postpone collection of the
amount due until the defendant takes advantage of the benefit of his
act by operating the mine or by selling it at a value reflecting the fact
that it can be operated. In the case of the dike, the benefit to the
defendant is not necessarily clear. The plaintiff's fear of inundation
might have been reasonable. But it is open to the defendant to argue
that he was willing to take the risk and save the expenditure. If
eventually it transpires that there would have been no inundation, the
defendant's gamble succeeded, and he ought to be free from liability.
But if it becomes evident that but for the plaintiffs dike a flood
156. For example, an expenditure made in order to provide water for
irrigation might be required to save an existing crop; however, it can also lead
to better a harvest, which may be seen as creating additional wealth. See also
supra note 87.
157. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
158. See Ulmer v. Famworh, 15 A. 65 (Me. 1888); Berry & Gould v. Berry,
757 A.2d 108, 116 (Md. 2000); see also supra Section V.A.
159. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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would have occurred, the case for contribution becomes stronger.
160
There arises, however, the question of the group that enjoys the
protection of the dike and the extent of the benefit to each member.
If there is only one additional landowner who benefited from the
dike, it seems to me that he ought to contribute. But if the benefit
inures to a wide group, then in the absence of a fund, the matter
becomes too complex for private law. Free riding can then be
avoided only through public law machinery. The dike has to be built
by a public authority that will spread the cost by taxation.
160. This is subject to the reservation regarding the situation in which the
plaintiff was under an obligation to maintain the dike. See AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 86.
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